Rodney Brooks once wrote that robots would be human when treating them as though they were human was the most efficient way of interacting with them. (Not a precise quote.)
This is an interesting variation on the Turing test. It assumes that we decide the smartness of machines in the context of frequent interactions with them. It also builds on an interesting idea: that in order to deal with another entity, be it human, animal or mineral, we naturally build an internal model of the entity: how it behaves, what it can do, how it is likely to react to stimuli etc. That model exists for all entities that we interact with; a rock is not likely to kick you back, your word processor will likely crash before you can save the document etc.
When the most effective way to predict the behavior of a machine is to assume that it has similar internal structure to ourselves, then it will, for all intents and purposes, be human.
So, here is another thought: how do we know that another human is human? Although this sounds flippant, there are many instances where we forget that another person is a real person: soldiers must do this in order to carry out their job; terrorists must de-humanize their enemy in order to justify their atrocities.
I think that we only really recognize another person as human when we can relate personally to them. In most cases, what that means, is recognizing the other person's behavior as symptomatic of something that we ourselves have experienced. In effect, the model building process consists largely of seeing someone's reaction to an event and relating it to something that we ourselves have experienced. (An aside: how often, when told of some event or situation as it affects someone we know, do we react by quoting something from our own past/situation that somehow is analogous?)
At the heart of this phenomenon is something curious: conventionally, the Turing test is phrased in such a way as to decide whether the other entity is human or not. However, it may be more accurate to say that what we do everyday is try to decide if we ourselves could somehow be that other person (or entity) we are interacting with? Furthermore, it may be, that this emphasizing is only possible because fundamentally, we are all clones to 99.99%: we are all running the same operating system in our mind as it were. We can predict the other person's responses because they could be our responses also.
What does this mean? Well, perhaps we need a new formulation of Turing's test: an entity can be considered human if we believed that we would react the way that the entity reacts had we been that entity. Another consequence may be that machines may be smart and intelligent etc. but not human simply because the code that they run is not our code. A cultural difference between people and machines if you will.
This is an interesting variation on the Turing test. It assumes that we decide the smartness of machines in the context of frequent interactions with them. It also builds on an interesting idea: that in order to deal with another entity, be it human, animal or mineral, we naturally build an internal model of the entity: how it behaves, what it can do, how it is likely to react to stimuli etc. That model exists for all entities that we interact with; a rock is not likely to kick you back, your word processor will likely crash before you can save the document etc.
When the most effective way to predict the behavior of a machine is to assume that it has similar internal structure to ourselves, then it will, for all intents and purposes, be human.
So, here is another thought: how do we know that another human is human? Although this sounds flippant, there are many instances where we forget that another person is a real person: soldiers must do this in order to carry out their job; terrorists must de-humanize their enemy in order to justify their atrocities.
I think that we only really recognize another person as human when we can relate personally to them. In most cases, what that means, is recognizing the other person's behavior as symptomatic of something that we ourselves have experienced. In effect, the model building process consists largely of seeing someone's reaction to an event and relating it to something that we ourselves have experienced. (An aside: how often, when told of some event or situation as it affects someone we know, do we react by quoting something from our own past/situation that somehow is analogous?)
At the heart of this phenomenon is something curious: conventionally, the Turing test is phrased in such a way as to decide whether the other entity is human or not. However, it may be more accurate to say that what we do everyday is try to decide if we ourselves could somehow be that other person (or entity) we are interacting with? Furthermore, it may be, that this emphasizing is only possible because fundamentally, we are all clones to 99.99%: we are all running the same operating system in our mind as it were. We can predict the other person's responses because they could be our responses also.
What does this mean? Well, perhaps we need a new formulation of Turing's test: an entity can be considered human if we believed that we would react the way that the entity reacts had we been that entity. Another consequence may be that machines may be smart and intelligent etc. but not human simply because the code that they run is not our code. A cultural difference between people and machines if you will.